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A key purpose of the IHR is to prevent unwarranted interruptions to trade and travel during large 
and/or transnational infectious disease outbreaks. Nevertheless, such outbreaks continue to 
disrupt the travel industry. This aspect of the IHR has received little attention in the academic 
literature despite its considerable impact on affected States and commercial activity. This paper 
outlines the challenges and gaps in knowledge regarding the relationship between outbreaks and 
the travel sector and discusses the opportunities for further research and policy work to 
overcome these challenges. 
 
Methodology 
We conducted a literature review on the relationship between outbreaks and travel restrictions, 
with a particular focus on the 2014-16 Ebola epidemic in West Africa. This review was 
complemented by an expert roundtable at Chatham House and further supported by case studies 





Numerous travel stakeholders are affected by, and affect, large-scale infectious disease 
outbreaks. These stakeholders react in different ways: peer pressure plays an important role for 
both governments and the travel sector, and the reactions of the media and public influence and 
are influenced by these stakeholders. While various data sources on travel are available, and 
WHO is mandated to work with States, there is no recognised coordinating body to disseminate 
timely, consistent, reliable and authoritative information and best practices to all stakeholders.  
 
Conclusion 
This article highlights the interdependent relationship between various travel stakeholders. The 
reasons for interruption of travel during the 2014-16 Ebola outbreak were complex, with 
decisions by States only partly contributing to the cessation. Decisions by non-state actors, 
particularly the travel industry itself, contributed significantly and were based on a variety of 
factors.  Further research, analysis and policy development is required to mitigate the health and 
economic consequences of infectious disease outbreaks. Any further research will also need to 




Travel restrictions and infectious disease outbreaks 
Background 
In 2019, the travel and tourism sector contributed $2.8 trillion directly to the global economy and 
indirectly accounted for 10.4% of global GDP ($8.8 trillion), 310 million jobs, $1.6 trillion in 
exports, and 27.2% of services exports.1 International tourist arrivals are estimated to increase by 
3.3% until 2030, with an additional 43 million tourist arrivals occurring every year.2 The sector 
is vulnerable to disruption during infectious disease outbreaks, acting as a disincentive for 
countries to report outbreaks. The International Health Regulations (IHR 2005) – a legally-
binding agreement between 196 states — thus aim to strengthen reporting of infectious disease 
outbreaks while at the same time deter other states from imposing unwarranted travel 
restrictions.   
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), restricting the movement of people and 
goods during outbreaks is ineffective in most contexts, and may instead stifle the delivery of aid 
and technical support in addition to the social and economic repercussions for affected countries. 
While specific travel measures may prove useful in the short-term in some instances, for 
example to allow countries to gain time to strengthen preparedness, States are required to 
provide WHO the public health rationale and relevant evidence for such measures within 48 
hours of implementation.3 
Nevertheless, unwarranted measures interfering with travel are common. During the 2014-2016 
Ebola epidemic, for example, travel to and from the affected countries in West Africa was 
limited or suspended, disrupting the economies of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone and 
hampering the humanitarian and epidemic response.4–6 The IHR directly bind States, but 
minimizing the impact on travel in outbreaks also needs an understanding of the role of non-
State actors including the media, social media, travel and tourism industries and the public. 
Drawing on the work of the post-West Africa Ebola IHR Review Committee report and 
incorporating research gathered during and in preparation for an expert roundtable co-convened 
by the Chatham House Centre on Global Health Security and the Graduate Institute of 
International and Development Studies Global Health Centre in 2017, this article synthesizes the 
available information on this issue. 
At the time of writing, the world is facing an unprecedented health crisis with the global spread 
of novel coronavirus (COVID-19). Large-scale travel restrictions are being implemented in 
response to the pandemic, despite official recommendations from WHO advising against 
prolonged restrictions of international traffic.7,3 It is within this context that we reflect on the 
lessons learned during the 2014-2016 Ebola outbreak in West Arica, and identify gaps, 
challenges and opportunities for further research, action and policy making on travel and 




We undertook a review of the literature related to infectious disease outbreaks, travel and 
tourism in 2017, with a particular focus on the 2014-2015 Ebola epidemic in West Africa. As 
part of this review, two case studies were developed to illustrate reactions to outbreaks using an 
analysis of travel-related interviews (with the consent of the interviewees) presented to the IHR 
Review Committee (5 individuals). 
This review informed the roundtable co-convened by the Chatham House Centre on Global 
Health Security and the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies Global 
Health Centre in November 2017. There were 19 participants from government, academia, the 
media, WHO and national public health institutes, and the travel and tourism industry, including 
airlines, travel security firms and industry associations. Prominent omissions included travel 
insurance firms and humanitarian organizations whose operations were affected by the travel 
restrictions imposed on affected countries in West Africa.  
The roundtable addressed identification of the main challenges; understanding these within and 
outside each sector; listing effective tools, policies, or practices to mitigate the negative impacts 
of outbreaks on industries and on economies; and what new arrangements were required. 
Following the roundtable, audio recordings were transcribed and analysed using inductive 
coding to identify and define key themes, which are presented below alongside the results of the 





















Many stakeholders either contribute to, or are adversely affected by, travel restrictions, including 
(but not limited to) States; international governmental organizations; industry, workers and their 
international associations; the media, including social media; the public; and humanitarian 
organizations who rely on travel and trade resources to respond to emergencies (Figure 1).  
States’ reactions during outbreaks 
Despite the IHR, States often react in ways that interfere with international traffic sometimes 
without a public health justification, including border closures, visa bans, denial of entry, 
STATES 
• States enacting travel restrictions 
• States directly affected by outbreaks 
ASSOCIATIONS  OF STATE-LEVEL STAKEHOLDERS 
• International Civil Aviation Society (ICAO) 
• International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
• World Health Organization (WHO) 
• World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) 
INDUSTRIES 
• Tourism industry 
• Hospitality 
• Arts, culture, sports 
• Travel industry 
• Airlines 
• Cruise lines/Shipping 
• Tour operators 
ASSOCIATIONS OF INDUSTRY STAKEHOLDERS 
• Representing corporations 
• Airports Council International (ACI) 
• International Air Transport Association 
(IATA) 
• International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) 
• World Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC) 
• Representing  workers 
• Association of Flight Attendants (AFA) 
• International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ 
Association (IFALPA) 
MEDIA (including social media) 
HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS 
Figure 1: Examples of key stakeholders 
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mandatory quarantines, requirement of medical certificates, border screenings and travel 
advisories.  
 
Our review identified four published studies investigating country adherence to IHR guidance 
during outbreaks. One study by Worsnop (2019) investigated reasons for delays in States 
reporting outbreaks to WHO.8 Two reasons were proposed: first, some States do not have 
capacity to detect outbreaks in a timely manner (as in the 2014-16 Ebola outbreak) and second, 
some States conceal outbreaks to forestall trade and travel restrictions from other States (for 
example, the 2003 SARS outbreak). The author also noted that WHO has not publicly criticized 
(“name and shame”) governments imposing excessive trade and travel restrictions. 
An earlier study by Worsnop (2016) investigated reasons why governments imposed trade and 
travel restrictions during the 2009 H1N1 outbreak, contrary to WHO recommendations.9 Of the 
47 States that imposed restrictions, the author found that democracies with weak health 
infrastructure were more likely to impose restrictions. The author suggests that restrictions can 
“quell public fear and instil confidence… by signalling to domestic constituents that the state is 
taking action.” To an “electorally-minded government,” these domestic gains are likely to 
outweigh the international backlash to flouting of the IHR, especially where States lack 
confidence in their own ability to effectively respond to an outbreak. Worsnop additionally 
highlights evidence that the public overestimates the effectiveness of restrictions during 
outbreaks, citing one survey where 70% of Americans expressed a desire for the imposition of 
more restrictive border measures during the 2014-16 Ebola outbreak.10 
A 2017 study by Rhymer and Speare investigated governments’ reactions during the 2014-16 
Ebola outbreak. Of the 187 countries, 58 (31.0%) imposed restrictions that exceeded or appeared 
to exceed WHO’s temporary travel recommendations: 43 (23.0%) prohibited entry to foreigners 
travelling from countries with widespread Ebola transmission. A further 15 (8.0%) applied other 
types of exclusions and restrictions, including the requirement to produce a medical certificate 
verifying no Ebola infection (eight countries, 4.3%) and mandatory quarantine (six countries, 
3.2%). One country allowed entry to foreigners working in affected countries but denied entry to 
citizens from those same countries.11 In addition, some countries imposed a 21-day quarantine 
on ships trading along the West Coast of Africa if they had visited an Ebola affected country.12 
Patterson (2018) found that African States were more likely than non-African States to impose 
Ebola-related travel restrictions, highlighting the role of proximity.13 In addition 66% of 
democracies and 63% of autocracies in sub-Saharan Africa imposed restrictions, suggesting that 
Worsnop’s hypothesis (2016) may not hold for States proximal to outbreak-affected countries.  
Of African States hosting more tourists than the continental average, 92% imposed travel 
restrictions on Ebola-affected countries, suggesting States were willing to prioritise travel 
restrictions on outbreak-affected countries in order to maintain their own travel and tourism 
industry. 
Mouchtouri et al. (2019) highlight a point raised by several roundtable participants: specific 
measures taken during outbreaks may serve a legitimate purpose even if they have limited 
effectiveness in identifying cases. Entry and exit screenings cannot detect asymptomatic cases, 
with a negligible number of cases identified during the 2016 Zika, 2014-16 Ebola, 2009 H1N1 
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and 2003 SARS outbreaks. However, it is argued that such measures may “maintain confidence 
that air travel is safe,” thereby avoiding more excessive restrictions (there is a need for further 
research to support this contention).14 
Travel sector reactions during outbreaks 
Non-state actors are not directly bound by the IHR, with no single set of rules or norms for 
companies and industry associations with respect to outbreaks. This makes it difficult for 
businesses to strike an appropriate balance between implementing necessary measures to protect 
their commercial interests and imposing unwarranted travel restrictions.4 
However, it is often difficult to isolate the reactions of travel organizations from those of States. 
The case studies below demonstrate the intertwined nature of outbreak-related decision-making 
between all stakeholders.   
Case study 1: H1N1 influenza outbreak and Mexico 
The 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic originated in Mexico. On 1st May, WHO released a 
statement titled ‘No rationale for travel restrictions’ asserting that restrictions on travel would 
have minimal impact on preventing the spread of the virus, ‘but would be highly disruptive to 
the global community’.14 Despite this, half of 56 countries surveyed advised their citizens to 
avoid travelling to affected states.15  
These included the UK, whose Foreign and Commonwealth Office issued advice against ‘all 
but essential travel’ to Mexico.16 Several UK-based travel operators such as Thomson, First 
Choice Holidays, and Thomas Cook cancelled trips to Mexico during the advisory period and 
beyond.17 It is unclear whether this was a direct response to the travel advisory, or for some 
other reason, such as cancelled bookings, pressure from their insurers, or concerns over 
healthcare provision in Mexico. 
Other commercial airlines decreased flight numbers in response to reduced demand, for 
example Continental Airlines (US) air traffic to and from Mexico reduced by 40%, indicating 
public concern influenced commercial activity.18 A study modelling the impact of air-traffic 
reduction showed that it only delayed the spread of the infection by three days.18 In addition, 
five large global cruise lines cancelled their stops at ports in Mexico with US travel agents 
reportedly recommending that clients travel to alternate destinations.19 The overall impact 
resulted in nearly one million cancelled trips at an estimated $2.8 billion loss to Mexico’s 
tourism industry.20 A more extreme reaction was China which forcibly quarantined 
asymptomatic Mexican nationals in hotels, allegedly under instruction from the Chinese 
government after one Mexican entered the country who had contracted H1N1.21  
 
The IHR Review Committee report emphasized the need for governments to make travel-
related decisions based on available evidence, and for WHO to ‘energetically’ attain public 
health and scientific-based rationales for unwarranted restrictions.22 However, few 
governments informed WHO that they were implementing travel restrictions, and even fewer 




Case Study 2: Air travel during the 2014-2016 Ebola outbreak—British Airways and Brussels 
Airlines 
During the 2014-16 Ebola outbreak in West Africa, transport to and from the three most 
affected States was disrupted by flight cancellations.23 All but two airlines, Brussels Airlines 
and Air Maroc, suspended their flights. This case study summarises the IHR Review 
Committee’s findings and the experience of two airlines.  
The IHR Review Committee identified key barriers to ensuring uninterrupted travel during the 
outbreak: 
• A lack of clear and consistent communication between relevant travel and transport 
entities (e.g. IATA and ICAO) and public health authorities (e.g. WHO) resulted in 
inconsistent, inappropriate and delayed information for private companies. 
• Non-affected States introduced a variety of travel restrictions or requirements that 
obstructed flight operations. For example, government restrictions relating to recent 
travel to affected States made scheduling of operations and crew very difficult. 
• Some States denied flights permission to overfly and/or land for refuelling or transit, 
even when no passengers with Ebola were on board. This complicated the evacuation 
of individuals with other health issues (e.g. malaria and gastroenteritis). 
• Airline companies could not guarantee medical care in-country or via aeromedical 
evacuation for their crew and ground staff who developed non-Ebola health issues. 
• In certain cases, individuals who appeared ill during exit screening were quarantined in 
unhygienic conditions with Ebola patients.23 
 
Despite British Airways and Brussels Airlines apparently facing the same set of challenges, 
their responses diverged. British Airways suspended flights to West Africa and has yet to 
resume service as of January 2020. While an inability to ensure a safe working environment 
for its staff was noted as the main reason for flight suspension, interview respondents also 
identified other factors including staff anxiety, which was largely fuelled by media and social 
media reporting, and the business imperative: airlines are commercial entities that must protect 
their financial interests, which means suspending flights that are economically non-viable 
owing to reduced demand. One roundtable participant also highlighted the incongruence 
between the Ebola advisories coming from different public health authorities such as the US 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (US CDC), the European Centre for Disease 
Prevention and Control (ECDC), Public Health England, and WHO; this disconnect 
undermined confidence in the advisories and had a negative impact on staff. 
 
In contrast to British Airways, Brussels Airlines continued flights to West Africa, transporting 
more than 80,000 passengers and 2,000 tons of freight, mostly aid supplies, to the region.24 
The airline frequently commented that the humanitarian imperative underpinned its decision. 
For example, Geert Sciot, a vice president at Brussels Airlines, told Time: ‘Without our flights 
it would become almost impossible for medical staff to reach the country’.25 
Reasons for Brussels Airlines maintaining operations included its small size which made 
communication and trust-building with staff and trade unions easier; instituting an ‘opt-out’ 
rather than ‘opt-in’ system for staff who did not wish to fly to affected countries; partnering 
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with Médecins Sans Frontières to deliver safety briefings to trade union representatives; upper 
management taking on roles as air stewards to and from Ebola-affected countries to 
demonstrate that flying was safe; and relocating the West African crew base to Senegal, thus 
removing the need for overnight accommodation in affected countries.5,24,26,27 Interview 
respondents also highlighted that Brussels Airlines was more dependent on its commercial 
activity in West Africa than British Airways and other major airlines. As a consequence, the 
company and its employees had a more significant stake in maintaining services. 
 
One roundtable participant highlighted the indirect impact of restrictions during the 2014-16 
Ebola outbreak when some US states imposed a quarantine period which affected flight crews 
carrying out aeromedical evacuation of Ebola patients. These quarantine periods thereby reduced 
crew availability for (non-Ebola) routine aeromedical evacuations within the US. This example 
also highlights a further complication in State’s reactions to outbreaks, as in some federal States 
(such as the US), the individual states have a significant degree of autonomy with unclear 
divisions of authority between sub-national and national levels. 
Media reactions during outbreaks 
 
At the outset of a health emergency, the public and other stakeholders often use the news media 
and increasingly social media for up-to-date information and guidance. The news media is 
particularly influential when the urgency of the public health situation is not matched by the 
speed at which authoritative information is provided from actors such as States or the WHO.28 
The IHR Review Committee noted critical limitations in WHO’s capacity to provide timely, 
relevant, and evidence-based information to stakeholders to inform their decision-making during 
the 2014-2016 Ebola epidemic,23 thus requiring the public and other key stakeholders to turn to 
the news media to understand complex scientific information and develop advice on response 
measures.29 In such a context, media coverage can sometimes be sensationalized or exaggerated 
rather than objective29–31 and sometimes not entirely accurate.  For example,  a roundtable 
participant highlighted a news outlet describing Ebola as ‘biological ISIS’, whilst during the 
SARS outbreak, studies demonstrated that media reporting tended to create unwarranted fear and 
exaggerate the real risk of travelling to affected areas.30,32 
 
Social media, such as Twitter, WhatsApp, and Facebook, increasingly provides new avenues for 
communication and information sharing. On the one hand, social media platforms are an 
important tool for disseminating accurate information, engaging the public, and dispelling 
rumours and misinformation shared during crises.33 On the other hand, it provides an opportune 
platform for misinformation to spread rapidly.34  Participants agreed that once an inaccurate 
message has been circulated through either news or social media, it is very difficult to counter. 
Encouragingly, at the time of writing, a number of social media companies are actively enforcing 
measures to combat the spread of misinformation regarding COVID-19 on their platforms.35 
 
A number of participants highlighted the importance of ‘geo-specificity’ during outbreak 
reporting, arguing that the media tend to focus on the entire State or region rather than the 
specific pockets affected. This lack of geo-specificity can lead travellers to perceive unaffected 
areas or even entire regions (e.g. Africa), as ‘high-risk’. 33, 37,36  The impact on the tourism sector 
is particularly high given its reliance on discretionary spending with tourists able to change their 
plans relatively easily in response to media coverage,37 with widespread disruption of tourism 
across Africa during the West African Ebola outbreak.38 Participants also postulated that 
sensational media reporting may have deterred aid workers travelling to West Africa and was a 
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key reason behind private sector decision-making, for example suspension of flights owing to the 
anxieties of crew and their families. Interviewees also perceived the media to have influenced 
the UK government during the 2014-2016 Ebola outbreak leading it to implement increasingly 
restrictive measures so as to appear to the public that it was ‘doing something’ to stop the virus 
from spreading to the UK.  
 
Media roundtable participants emphasised that their ability to report responsibly is dependent on 
their access to accurate, timely and authoritative information. They will prioritize information 
from official sources such as governments and WHO, however, this is not always available. 
WHO was singled out by media participants as being too slow, leading them to rely on 
alternative sources during the 2014-16 Ebola outbreak such as Médecins Sans Frontières.  
 
A participant from a national news service who was praised for their accurate and responsible 
coverage of the Ebola outbreak in West Africa highlighted the importance of having daily 
conversations with experts (although there was an issue as to who constituted an “expert”) and 
on-the-ground health workers. The general view of participants was that the news media could 
and would make positive contributions during outbreaks if relations between them and public 
health authorities (including WHO and national authorities) could be proactively developed. 
Key challenges  
Peer pressure  
Several participants highlighted the role of peers in influencing the actions of private actors and 
governments. One participant described how company executives react to other companies 
suspending operations: ‘Executives say, “Well, that company is protecting their employees this 
much, and we also value our employees,”’ and then proceed to follow suit.  A representative 
from a national public health institute spoke about the experience of working alongside the 
national government during the global 2009 H1N1 outbreak: 
 
‘[Politicians] will say, “So, that country has entry screening [for H1N1], why don’t we?” 
And, then we argue, “Yes, but it’s not evidence-based, and the WHO is not 
recommending it.”  Then they will say, “Yes, but that country is doing it, and they have 
epidemiologists as well advising them to do so.”’ 
 
It was widely agreed that peer pressure compounds the problems arising from inadequate risk 
communication and uncertainty during outbreaks. 
Inadequate communication of risk to decision-makers 
Roundtable participants noted that the lack of authoritative, accurate and timely information 
during outbreaks available to decision-makers made them more likely to implement travel 
restrictions. In the case of the Ebola epidemic in West Africa, the routine WHO briefings, 
conducted in ‘Geneva time’ were considered by participants to be insufficient in a 24-hour 
world, where decisions must be made rapidly regardless of the time of day or night, and also 
across time zones.  
 
Roundtable participants claimed that outbreak-related guidance issued from WHO via member 
States is often insufficient, the language used is not perceived as authoritative, and may thus 
have contributed to decisions to reduce or stop travel. Roundtable participants from the travel 
and tourism industry, for example, found difficulty in translating technical advice into informed 
decisions about mitigation activities and this was compounded by incongruent advisories from 
the many States with which they interacted. Within this context, participants agreed that the 
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private sector would rather cease operations than risk their employees’ health and wellbeing.  It 
was also recommended that WHO develop a more transparent process for providing advice 
during outbreaks, justifying their recommendations with scientific evidence. This is especially 
relevant, as WHO’s credibility has been questioned following its delay in declaring the 2014-16 
Ebola outbreak a Public Health Emergency of International Concern, which some have also 
highlighted as a concern regarding the ongoing COVID-19 outbreak.6 
 
In summary, both private actors and States grapple with the issue of insufficient and conflicting 
information associated with an outbreak. Consequently, decision-makers must make a judgment 
based on perceived risk, influenced by their varying levels of risk tolerance and approaches to 
mitigating risk. A participant shared an anecdote reflecting this point: 
 
‘We held a simulation on outbreaks and travel… where the head of state of an economy 
with 80% of GDP based on tourism stood up and said, “In the absence of overwhelming 
information that suggests otherwise, I will act with an abundance of caution despite any 
technical recommendations to the contrary.”’ 
No agreed-upon central coordinating body 
Many roundtable participants suggested that no substantial progress can be made in mitigating 
the impact of outbreaks on travel and tourism without a central coordinating body to provide 
reliable communication channels between all stakeholders, disseminate evidence-based 
information, monitor stakeholders’ reactions and provide a mechanism for accountability if 
travel-related decisions by public and private actors unjustifiably interfere with global traffic and 
trade. This also reflects the post-Ebola IHR Review Committee recommendation to develop a 
taskforce to address this issue.23 
 
Some suggested that WHO was the most intuitive candidate for a central coordinating body, 
whilst others argued that WHO lacks the authority as its mandate is to advise national 
governments, not to regulate or coordinate private actors.  
 
Data collection and public monitoring would be important roles for any coordinating body. 
WHO collected data on reactions to the 2014-16 Ebola response, however this was focused on 
the reaction of States. Other international organizations collect potentially relevant data (Annex 
1) though many organizations charge access fees and the purpose of the data is currently 
unrelated to outbreaks. Roundtable participants highlighted three additional areas where 
monitoring by a coordinating authority could be useful: 
 
• Addressing incongruences between outbreak-related communications of public health 
authorities (e.g. WHO, US CDC, ECDC); 
• Co-ordinating travel- and outbreak-related communications by relevant private actors 
(e.g. airlines and tourist agencies); 
• Monitoring and correcting of outbreak-related messages on social media. 
 
Discussion 
IHR seeks to facilitate rapid communication by a State that it has identified an infectious disease 
outbreak whilst minimizing the economic consequences for that State by limiting restrictions on 
trade and travel to those necessary for public health. Applying unreasonable and unnecessary 
restrictions is likely to be a disincentive to early reporting. Despite the IHR, travel restrictions 
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exceeding WHO Temporary Recommendations were imposed during the 2014-16 Ebola 
outbreak,39 and similar restrictions are being applied during the current COVID-19 outbreak.40 
Our findings suggest that the issue of travel restrictions is much more complicated and nuanced 
than has been assumed and dependent on the decision-making of several interconnected 
stakeholders most of whom are not directly bound by IHR. 
 
However, States play a significant role, and are sometimes responsible for the cessation of trade 
and travel (e.g. the UK and China during the 2009 H1N1 outbreak in Mexico). In other cases, 
States did not physically or legally prevent trade or travel, but rather imposed measures that 
influenced public perception of safety or did nothing to quell the fears of the public. Our 
research also highlighted the impact of ‘peer pressure’ of states on each other.  
 
Our study confirms the finding in the IHR Review Committee report that travellers and other 
stakeholders employ their own semi-independent decision-making processes in the face of 
outbreaks. In essence, this is an assessment of the risk of continuing operations. For the travel 
industry and other commercial actors that rely on international travel it is influenced by official 
communications from various bodies; by the media; perceptions of the public and their 
workforce; and by the policies of other companies. Their assessment considers economic factors 
in addition to health and safety responsibilities and the scope for mitigation of risks. Perhaps 
inevitably, different stakeholders will come to different conclusions. Brussels Airlines applied 
different weights to individual factors compared to British Airways, and mitigated its risk using 
a variety of technical and other measures. Whether the technical measures could be scaled up to 
facilitate the functioning of other larger airlines requires further research. Table 1 Examples of 
factors which impact on travel during outbreaks.  
 
 
Individual travellers may also undertake their own risk assessment and be swayed by 
information from governments, the media and (in the case of workers) from their employer. 
They may also be forced by the actions of industry stakeholders (e.g. airlines or insurance 
companies) to forego their travel plans. Their risk appetite will also differ according to their 
purpose for travel, e.g. a holiday that can be rescheduled versus a business meeting that cannot 
wait.  
 
One common factor impacting the decision-making process is the lack of clear communication 
from different authorities and apparently differing advice from such authorities. Ships and 
aircraft receive directives and advice from authorities of the State in which they are based and of 
those to which they travel, in addition to advice from international bodies (such as WHO) and 
the media. Social media can also provide differing advice and information, some of it false. 
Differing advice causes confusion and a lack of confidence in any advice. 
 
The development of timely, consistent and authoritative information and advice is key to 
influencing behaviour of all stakeholders. Indeed, recognising such gaps has led WHO to 
develop new guidelines for emergency risk communication which will be followed by detailed 
manuals and training tools to elaborate the recommendations.41 A number of measures taken by 
WHO since 2014 may also act to minimize the adverse impact on travel and tourism. These 
include WHO’s restructuring and its Health Emergencies Programme;42 the development of the 
Joint External Evaluation tool to assess States IHR capability;43 WHO’s strengthened monitoring 
through media signals of measures imposed by states which can limit international travel; its 
more regular communication with ICAO, IATA, and the IMO; and the inclusion of findings 
related to travel in situation reports.44 The World Economic Forum has also developed a ‘travel 
and tourism’ platform as part of its Epidemic Readiness Accelerator. The platform, to be 
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launched in 2020, will bring the private sector together with states and WHO for greater 
coordination and communication related to outbreak preparedness and response.45 However, 
there is still no clear answer as to who is responsible for communicating with, and monitoring 
the actions of, the wide variety of public and private travel and tourism stakeholders, many of 
whom have a multi-national presence. 
 
The role of the media in influencing States’ decision-making needs further consideration.  
WHO interacts with individual States via Health Ministries and their National Focal Points, but 
it is often Heads of State and other Ministries who make final decisions. Addressing the other 
players and factors that impact travel and tourism may minimise the risk of States imposing 
unnecessary measures. WHO is expected to release guidelines on the health and economic 
impacts of the different measures that States often impose in response to outbreaks in 2020 and it 
is hoped that such guidance will provide the evidence decision-makers need to refrain from 
implementing ineffective measures that interfere with travel.42  
 
Our study has limitations. Although our literature review attempted to be thorough, it was not 
systematic and may have missed some relevant studies. Those attending the roundtable were 
identified through existing networks of the authors, their colleagues at Chatham House and 
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, and participants at earlier 
roundtables convened on the topics of monitoring46 and the health and economic consequences 
of outbreaks.4 Many invitees were unable to attend and funding limited the ability to host a 
number of roundtables or any outside of Europe. Regrettably, stakeholders from countries 
affected by the 2014-16 Ebola outbreak were not present, although most stakeholder industries 
were represented. The case studies were selected based on information gathered at the earlier 
roundtables, and are provided as heuristics rather than as a comprehensive dataset. Furthermore, 
this paper is published during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic which is outside the scope of 
the original research. The authors hope that the data and discussions presented herein will 
contribute to ongoing discussions as to the widespread travel restrictions currently in place. 
Conclusion 
Infectious disease outbreaks will inevitably impact travel and tourism. Given the complexity of 
decision-making during outbreaks, careful strategizing is required to consider how to mitigate 
this impact.  The research and analysis provided herein will now need reviewing in light of the 
current COVID-19 outbreak. No doubt, as with the 2014-16 Ebola epidemic reviewed herein, the 
reasons and mechanisms will be found to be complex and nuanced with the greatly increased 
risk of COVID-2019’s spread through air travel compared to Ebola a contributing factor. The 
epidemiology of the COVID-19 outbreak may also inform hypotheses on the impact of travel 
restrictions on limiting or slowing the spread of a viral respiratory pathogen. Further work is also 
required to determine whether some of the successful risk mitigation processes (such as those 
employed by Brussels Airlines during the Ebola epidemic in West Africa) can be scaled up in 
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Table 1 Examples of factors which impact on travel during outbreaks 
EXAMPLES OF MAIN DRIVERS OF DESCISIONS ON TRAVEL POLICY 
Area/Subject Impact Mitigation 
Epidemiology Nature of disease, potential for 
spread etc. For new diseases, 
uncertainty tends to more 
extreme restrictions. 
Investment in research and 
development, e.g. 
understanding disease; 







Declaration of Public Health 
Emergency of International 
Concern 
Primary impact: perception of 
policy makers and public. 
Pressure on States not to 
exceed any WHO 
Temporary 
Recommendations 
States – note character of 
States important (eg political, 
proximity to outbreak etc)  
May directly restrict travel via 
Visa bans etc or indirectly via 
wording of “advisories”.   
Pressure on Governments 
not to exceed WHO 
recommendations. 
In Federal States (eg USA), 
individual states (eg 
California)  
Individual states may have 
different policies on for 
example quarantine 




Advice will be industry 
specific; should be coherent 
with WHO recommendations. 
Communication with 
national representatives. 
Identify a co-ordinating 
body. 
Messaging from media and 
social media 
Can be influential in driving 
behaviour of policy makers 
and public.   
Open and objective 
engagement with media; 
active rebuttal of “false 
news” 
Peer pressure Evidence that States, business 
and travelling public 
influenced by other States, 
businesses etc 
Maintaining active 
messaging in support of 
objective policies 
Travel Insurance policies Non-availability will deter 
most from travelling. 
 
Economics May make travel uneconomic. Government subsidy. 
EXAMPLES OF IMPACT OF SPECIFIC POLICIES 
Industrial relations Those having the trust of their 
employees less affected 
 
Overflying restrictions   Re-routing where feasible. 
Quarantine for those arriving 
from affected countries 
May impact on availability of 
flight crews  
Re-routing to alternative 
airfields where feasible 
Weak in-country health 
facilities 
May make overnight stops by 
flight crew unsafe 
Adding a technical stop (see 
Brussels Airlines case 
study) 
Availability of aeromedical 
evacuation. 
If routine evacuation stops., 
places workers at risk 
Not allowing travel crew to 
disembark in affected 
country. 
Incoherence between policies 
of different States or between 
similar businesses 
Leads to lack of confidence in 
any recommendations. 
Active messaging and 





Annex 1. Examples of travel- and tourism-related data collected by international 
organizations 
Organization Data Collected 
Data 
Accessibility 
Airports Council International (ACI) 
https://aci.aero/ 
Monthly airport data on 
passenger, cargo, and traffic 
movements; publishes reports 
on traffic forecasts and special 







Collaborative Arrangement for the 
Prevention and Management of Public 
Health Events in Civil Aviation (CAPSCA) 
www.capsca.org/ 
Conducts gap analyses in 
states and airports, compiles 
formal reports for respective 
states/aviation authorities but 
does not publish these 
Not 
applicable 
International Air Transport Association 
(IATA) 
www.iata.org/ 
Monthly data on domestic and 
international traffic, publishes 
passenger and freight 
forecasts; also publishes the 
Global Aviation Data 
Management program, which 
provides aggregated data on 
safety and accidents, and 




International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) 
www.icao.int/ 
Has been collecting data for 
30+ years on air carrier traffic, 
airport traffic, air carrier fleet, 




International Maritime Organization 
(IMO) 
www.imo.org/ 
No systematic data collection 
relevant to travel; publishes 
meeting summaries and 
outbreak communiqués  
Publicly 
accessible 
International Labour Organization (ILO) 
www.ilo.org/  
Extensive employment data 
available by sector 
Publicly 
accessible 
United Nations Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) 
www.unocha.org  
No systematic data collection 
relevant to travel; releases 
annual reports that cover 




Ports, Airports and Ground Crossings 
Network (PAGNet) 
extranet.who.int/pagnet/   
No publicly available data 
collection; however, it is a 
platform for public health 
officials to share information 
on public health activities at 






States Parties to the IHR (2005) States Parties may provide a 
source for information on any 
travel and transport 
restrictions they have 
implemented during 
outbreaks, and the motivations 
behind these restrictions, 
however, this information 






Measures annual Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), 
transport services, travel 
services, and relevant various 
health, international tourism 
and infrastructure (including 




World Health Organization (WHO) 
www.who.int  
Monitors reports of additional 
measures during outbreaks, 
such as travel restrictions and 
bans; however, these data are 
based on incomplete 
information as few countries 
actively inform WHO of these 
measures and very few justify 
the use of these measures 
when requested for more 
information; 
IHR Event Information Site 
(EIS) is used to disseminate 
information and alerts on 
public health events and 
allows for communication 
between the WHO and 






World Economic Forum (WEF)  
Epidemic Readiness Accelerator 
https://www.weforum.org/projects/managing-
the-risk-and-impact-of-future-epidemics 
No data collection at the time 
of publication; ‘travel and 
tourism’ platform, to be 
launched in 2020, will bring 
private sector together with 
WHO and states for greater 
coordination and 
communication related to 




World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) 
www.e-unwto.org  
E-library with data on tourism 
in more than 198 states and 
territories from 1995 – 2018 





World Trade Organization (WTO) 
www.wto.org  
Uses UNWTO and WTO-
UNCTAD-ITC data to 
produce annual reports that 
include analyses of 








Produces quarterly ‘Economic 
Impact’ reports including data 
on business and domestic 
tourism spending, and total 
contribution of tourism to 
employment and state GDP 
Publicly 
accessible 
 
 
